Is the number ten role on its way back for Liverpool?
Jürgen Klopp built his two-time Bundesliga-winning Borussia Dortmund side around a No.10 in a 4-2-3-1 system – and we could see something similar at Liverpool in 2022/23.
One of the most notable tactical themes of Jürgen Klopp’s Liverpool tenure so far has been the almost complete absence of orthodox numbers tens – i.e. a central attacking midfielder behind a main striker. In many ways, it has defined Liverpool’s evolution, as the lack of a No.10 has shaped the dynamic of both the midfield and forward line.
It’s an intriguing one, because it’s not as if Klopp has been averse to playing with No.10s in the past. His title-winning Borussia Dortmund sides were built around a 4-2-3-1 system with a midfield double pivot, a No.10 (usually Shinji Kagawa or Mario Götze) flanked by two wide attacking midfielders, and a lone striker leading the line (Lucas Barrios to begin with, and then Robert Lewandowksi following his arrival from Lech Poznan in the summer of 2010).
The personnel would occasionally change, and he would sometimes switch to more of a 4-5-1 shape, especially in his final season when injuries decimated the squad, but by and large, Klopp rarely strayed too far away from his favoured 4-2-3-1 formation at Dortmund.
When he replaced Brendan Rodgers at Liverpool in October 2015, the players were certainly there to stick with his tried and tested formula if he’d wanted to. In Adam Lallana, Roberto Firmino and Philippe Coutinho, Liverpool had several options ideally suited to the No.10 role, as well as two big, muscular centre forwards in Divock Origi and Christian Benteke, both of whom Klopp had reportedly been interested in signing for Dortmund.
More often than not, though, Klopp went with a 4-3-3 (or 4-3-2-1) in the beginning, with Lallana, Coutinho and Firmino as an interchanging front three, supported by an industrious midfield unit of Lucas Leiva, Emre Can and James Milner. He reverted to 4-2-3-1 on a few occasions, particularly in the second half of the season when Origi and Daniel Sturridge came to the fore, but in 2016/17, it became clear that 4-3-3 was the go-to system Klopp wanted to build around.
Players who previously would’ve been classed as No.10s took on very different roles, with Firmino establishing himself as the linchpin of the front three – much more of a creator, facilitator and connector of play than a traditional penalty box striker – and Lallana and Wijnaldum reinventing themselves as all-action, box-to-box central midfielders.
Everything was falling into place nicely, and after securing Champions League qualification, Liverpool’s next major tactical advancement came about more by circumstance than design. Having seen his opportunities heavily restricted for the first few months of the 2017/18 season after arriving from Hull City in the summer, Andy Robertson took full advantage of an injury to Alberto Moreno and cemented his place as first choice left-back. A long-term injury to Nathaniel Clyne, meanwhile, opened the door for Trent Alexander-Arnold to make the step up from promising academy prospect to a first team regular.
Such was their athleticism and quality of delivery that Robertson and Alexander-Arnold became Liverpool’s primary creative forces, effectively functioning as auxiliary attackers in a five-man forward line against most opponents. With the two full-backs churning out assists so reliably, and with the front three of Firmino, Sadio Mane and Mohamed Salah capable of creating and converting chances at a phenomenal rate, the purpose of Liverpool’s midfield trio very much became geared around providing a platform for that quintet to do the damage.